Why speedy justice is no longer a luxury but a right in India

The right to a speedy trial is not a luxury in a modern democracy—it is a necessity. Delayed justice weakens public confidence in the legal system and raises serious questions about its fairness, efficiency, and ability to deliver timely redress. While this principle is explicitly enshrined in the constitutions of several democratic countries like the United States and in the European Convention on Human Rights, India, too, has embraced it through the interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution.

Speedy justice is embedded in Article 21

Though not expressly stated, the right to a speedy trial has been judicially read into Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the process of law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and a prolonged trial violates this spirit. A delayed trial is not only burdensome for the accused but also undermines the credibility of the criminal justice system itself.

Despite legal recognition, the actual state of India's criminal justice system tells a troubling story. Close to 2 crore cases are pending in lower courts, and over 35 lakh are stuck in High Courts. Worse, nearly two-thirds of all pending cases are criminal in nature. The conviction rate hovers around a meagre 6%, indicating either ineffective prosecution or broken processes—or both. This situation forces citizens to look outside the formal legal system, turning to informal or extra-legal means to resolve disputes or seek justice.

Why judicial backlog persists

Numerous expert committees and commissions, from the Rankin Committee (1925) to the 120th Law Commission Report, have studied the problem. The conclusions are consistent: the judicial system is starved of manpower, planning, and state attention. India has one of the poorest judge-to-population ratios, and despite repeated judicial and legislative recommendations to raise the ratio to 50 judges per million people, the number remains far below this benchmark.

Justice B.N. Kirpal (in All India Judges Association v. Union of India) rightly stated that without adequate judges, justice cannot be delivered, and the constitutional structure itself is compromised. The issue is no longer just about infrastructure but about maintaining the basic fabric of constitutional governance.

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The fast-track court initiative: a promising intervention

In response to the growing crisis, the Government of India, on the recommendation of the 11th Finance Commission, launched the Fast-Track Court (FTC) Scheme in 2000. It aimed to expedite long-pending cases and reduce the burden on regular courts. Initially ad hoc and intended to last until 2005, the scheme allocated funds to set up over 1,700 FTCs across the country.

These courts primarily focused on criminal cases, especially those involving undertrial prisoners. By employing retired judges or promoting eligible officers nearing retirement, the scheme ensured that experience and efficiency were channelled toward quick disposal of matters.

Apex court's validation and safeguards

Though introduced without prior consultation with the judiciary, the FTC scheme was upheld by the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India. The Court not only found the scheme constitutionally valid but also laid down comprehensive guidelines for appointments, functioning, and performance review of these courts. It ensured that integrity, experience, and physical capability became key factors in selecting judges for FTCs.

The Court directed that priority must be given to old pending cases and those involving undertrials. It also ordered that FTC appointments remain ad hoc and not automatically lead to regular promotions, thus preventing misuse of the system. Importantly, administrative oversight by High Courts and quarterly reports to the Supreme Court were mandated to maintain transparency.

The FTC initiative was a much-needed experiment that offered real-time relief to litigants and the justice system. However, ad hoc solutions are not long-term answers. Many FTCs ceased functioning once central funding stopped, proving that a permanent institutional framework is essential. If not backed by consistent recruitment, infrastructure, and staff support, fast-track mechanisms risk becoming ineffective.

Moreover, the appointment of competent prosecutors and proper court staff remains critical. Courts do not function in isolation; they need efficient administrative and prosecutorial arms to succeed.

Conclusion: toward a culture of timely justice

Fast-track courts have shown that with intent and innovation, the Indian judiciary can deliver results. But systemic change requires more than short-term schemes. The right to speedy justice must be backed by judicial strength, regular appointments, accountability, and political will. If India truly values its constitutional promises, it must treat delays in justice not as minor inconveniences but as direct violations of fundamental rights.

The FTC model, if refined and permanently integrated, could be a game changer in restoring public trust in the judiciary and making Article 21 a living, breathing right.